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ABSTRACT
We propose a way to explain the diversification of the branches of mathematics, distinguishing the
different approaches by means of which mathematical objects can be studied. In our philosophy of
mathematics, there is a base object, which is the abstract multiplicity that comes from our empirical
experience; However, due to our human condition, the analysis of such multiplicity is covered by
other empirical cognitive attitudes (approaches), diversifying the ways in which it can be conceived,
and consequently giving rise to different mathematical disciplines. This diversity of approaches
is founded on the manifold categories that we find in physical reality. We also propose, grounded
on this idea, the use of Aristotelian categories as a first model for this division, generating from it
a classification of mathematical branches. Finally we make a history review to show that there is
consistency between our classification, and the historical appearance of the different branches of
mathematics.
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1 Introduction
The act itself of knowing is differentiated by its object, which is that what the act is oriented to know. Philosophers of
the School use to distinguish in this object what is formal and what is material. Formal object (objectum formale) is the
aspect under which the object is related to the knowing faculty, while the material object (objectum materiale) is where
that aspect underlies [1, 4]. Is said therefore in agreement with this, that science has a material object (the set of entities
studied) and a formal object (its own point of view or particular approach).
Although sciences are differentiated by its object, as stated before, they are properly differentiated by their formal
object, since material object can be common to many sciences. Consequently what is specific of every science is its
formal object1.
Therefore branches of the same science should have similar point of view, otherwise they would be no branches, but
differentiated sciences. Simultaneously, they must have different objects, otherwise they would be the same branch. In
other words, branches of a science must have same object with respect to the science they are branches of, but different
object respect to the other branches.
So there are two ways a science can be divided into branches according to these two types of objects:
The division founded in the material object, consists simply in dividing the set of studied entities and naming a branch
to the study of each part. The partition criteria may vary, but is always directly recognizable as a property of studied
entities. For instance, in biology, whose material object we may say it is the set of living things, the partition can be
made so that one branch studies animals (zoology), another one plants (botany), and so on. That is, we take the set of
1This vision is usually present in many Logica Maior treatises of scolastic and neo-scolastic tradition; see [2], [3], [4] and [5]
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living beings, we divide it into subsets whose elements have properties in common, and we dedicate a branch to the
study of each subset of the partition.
In mathematics this occurs in a similar fashion, so we have a mathematical branch that studies integers (number theory),
graphs (graph theory), etc. This is the material way to dividing the branches of a science.
The other method in which a science can be divided is when its formal object ramifies, that is, when without abandoning
the specific approach of that specific science, certain aspects are considered. To use our same example, in biology there
are branches such as taxonomy, or evolutionary theory, that cannot be associated with a particular group of living beings.
They are branches that attend to different aspects of the living being in general.
In a similar fashion, mathematics, within its essential approach, divides its formal object into several sub-approaches,
with which different aspects of mathematical entities are studied. We try to identify these divisions from the mathematical
point of view to better understand the principles that govern the separation of the different areas in the so called exact
sciences.
As a context for our reasoning, we declare our position regarding the ontological status of mathematical objects;
we endorse moderate realism (mathematical entities are entities of reason –ens rationis– lacking of own existence
but founded on reality), and we conceive that mathematics is formally the science that studies the inherent order in
multiplicity, as multiplicity.
There are however different theories on the nature of mathematical objects, and also different theories on distinction of
sciences, some of them are not compatible with the foretold principles. The Bueno’s materialistic philosophy proposes
a alternative way for differentiation of sciences [6]. The unity of a science would be given by the categorial closure,
not by it’s object. Categorial closure takes place when terms in a science engender after operations more terms of the
same category (therefore they stay into the same field of science). G. Bueno also proposed a way to divide branches of
mathematics considering the different ways categorial closure can be produced. However should be noted that it implies
that branches of matematics are not really branches of a science, but independent sciences. So, within categorial closure
theory, we cannot talk about a single science called mathematics, because mathematics would be a collection of several
independent sciences. Such a view is also present in the philosophy of Javier de Lorenzo [7], and others [8].
The discussion of ontological status of mathematical objects is not in the scope of this article. However we may say that
the root proposition here is the one that states that mathematical thinking starts from abstraction of physical experience.
Starting from the idea that mathematics originates from abstraction, we have considered that different aspects of physical
reality we perceive should originate differences in the way we conceive mathematical objects. Hence we are assuming
that our perception of the physical world influences the way we approach mathematical problems and therefore the way
we divide mathematics into different areas in agreement of physical categories.
So the method we propose begins with a system of physical categories, and use it as a criterion for branching the
different mathematical approaches out.
For this purpose we consider the classic system of Aristotelian categories. We have also considered other systems of
categories, such as the Kantian [9], the N. Hartman [10] system or other more recent ones; like the also Aristotelian
system of Invar Jonhanson [11], that of Roderick Chisholm [12], that of Reinhardt Grossman [13] or that of Joshua
Hoffman and Gary Rosenkrantz [14] or also that of EJ Lowe [15]. All in all, we have chosen the Aristotle’s system
because its importance and influence, also seems to us to be the most adequate for our objectives.
However, we should not rely on the peripatetic system without carefully reviewing it, and removing those elements that
do not seem truly fundamental to us. Our goal is to have a catalog of elementary categories, to understand the origin of
the ramification of the various mathematical disciplines at their most fundamental level.
The discussion in itself of a new categorial system supposes a separate study, but this is not the object of this work, so
we will briefly expose the origin of our collection of categories.
According to the Stagirite (1b25-2a4) there are ten categories: substance and nine genera of accidents:
From that list we have to remove the categories that are not really fundamental to us. Since substance is not directly
accessible to sensory perception (only accidents are), we will just take categories that are accidents. Consider first the
situs, the posture. It is really about the location of the parts with respect to the whole, so it cannot be a fundamental
category, since it emerges from the ubi of the parts. As for the relation (relatio), we could consider it as a epicategory,
since really the relation is always said of another category: to be bigger than [quantity], to be better than [quality], etc.
So instead of talking about relationship as a category, it would be more consistent to talk about relative categories. We
will also exclude anthropomorphic categories, such as habitus (to be dressed, to be armed...), since it is only a concept
that has meaning for man by reason of his customs or social agreements, but not by reason of really characterized
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Where [ubi]
When [quando]
Posture [situs]
relation [relatio]
Quantity [quantitas]
Quality [qualitas]
Habit [habitus]
Action [actio]
Passion [passio]
physical states. Aristotle himself has omitted this category in some of his listings (see [16, Category]) Thus, removing
situs, relatio, and habitus, we are left with three groups, as shown below:
1. Space-time categories
• Where [ubi]
• When [quando]
2. Categories of the internal constitution.
• Quantity [quantitas]
• Quality [qualitas]
3. Categories of external causality.
• Action [actio]
• Passion [passio]
Note that this category paradigm is related to the elements that are needed so that physical mutation would be possible.
The space-time is the "environment" required for physical changes to take place, or if you like, space and time are
the "effects" of movement. The categories of the second group come from the distinction between matter and form
(associating quantity with matter and quality with form); those are an internal articulation to the physical entity and are
necessary to make possible the execution of any physical change. Finally, the categories of third group are related to the
efficient causality of a change, since action is the act of producing a change, and passion is the act of being changed by
the action of an agent.
According to our thesis, each element of this collection is related to some mathematical approach, not in the sense
that mathematics studies physical issues, but because it has given rise to the abstractions that have naturally originated
specific mathematical approaches. These approaches are listed below.
1. Spatial-variational approaches
• Spatial or geometric approach [ubi]
• Variational approach [quando]
2. Quantitative-formal approaches
• Quantitative approach [quantitas]
• Qualitative and structural approach [qualitas]
3. Logical causality approaches.
• Solution approach (solution sets) [passio]
• Algorithmic approach (algorithms and functions) [actio]
The relationship of the first four approaches to the respective categories does not seem to need an explanation. However,
logical causality approaches require some clarification. Logical causality is said in analogy with ontological causality,
and in this sense the premises and reasoning are cause of the conclusion. We say that algorithms and functions do
something, hence they are related to the action category. While the solutions are made from some initial conditions and
a procedure. Hence we associate the solution with the passion category. Note that when we talk about algorithms or
solutions we are not referring to them as objects, but as a way of seeing objects. A mathematical object can be seen as a
solution or not, it will depend on the approach. For example, we can consider number 2 as a solution of the equation
x2 = 4, but this is not the only way to think about number 2.
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2 A brief survey: the different approaches in the historical development of mathematics
2.1 The material approach
This approach would be related to the category substantia, which does not refer to any accidental attribute of the
thing, but to the thing itself. It is not a point of view, it is simply a matter of studying a certain set of mathematical
objects but restricting our study to that set. For this reason we have to say that the material approach is in a sense a
pseudo-approach. The oldest branches of mathematics were distinguished in this way. Thus arithmetic was restricted to
the study of the discrete quantity, as the ancients said, while the continuous quantity was studied by Geometry. This
distinction lasted a long time, and to this day it is the element that specifies modern discrete mathematics. In the opinion
of some historians “the whole history of mathematics can be interpreted as the battle for supremacy between these two
concepts”[17, p. 13].
As we will see, both ancient arithmetic and geometry applied certain points of view, which really specified them, but
dividing a science by means of partitions in its object of study has always been the simplest. Hence, defining discrete
mathematics is a relatively easy task, and it is correctly defined as “the mathematical study of countable sets”.
Initially, geometry was a mathematical study of geometric figures, rather than a mathematical study of space. Much of
its early development was aimed at studying the properties of triangles, circles, rectangles, polygons, spheres... etc.
Arguably, in the beginning, geometry was an “object-oriented” science. However, this does not imply that there was no
notion of space as such. Certainly such a notion existed, and Euclid’s geometry, with its five postulates, establishes a
general structure for space, regardless of the figures conceived in it. Euclidean geometry is the first theory of space that
we have a record of.
At the time the brilliant Greek mathematician wrote the Elements, no other mathematical objects had been devised that
were related to the “continuous quantity” than geometric objects. Keep in mind that the notion of real number would
still take centuries to arrive.
Due to the above, the spatial approach distinguished geometry in the same way as the material approach that separated
mathematics between the discrete and the continuous.
However, this equivalence has been lost, since non-geometric points of view have appeared in the study of continuous
quantity, as well as geometric studies on discrete sets. This means that the spatial approach, characteristic of geometric
science, does not equate the restriction of mathematics to the study of continuous quantity. All this leads us to conclude
that to divide mathematics and understand what approaches its various branches engender, it is not correct (although it is
the easiest) simply split the set of mathematical objects by assigning to each branch an object class. Such a classification
procedure works for some cases (discrete mathematics or graph theory, to name two examples), but not for most.
2.2 The spatial approach in ancient mathematics
The spatial approach is to consider a multiplicity as distributed in space. Due to our physical experience, this approach
is particularly useful, as it allows us to represent mathematical ideas graphically and visibly, thus being able to use
imagination and fantasy to facilitate reasoning.
Actually, it is this approach that gave rise to geometry, for it is its characteristic way to think. Despite this and in a
secondary way, other points of view were applied in the study of geometric objects.
The quantitative approach was taken when questioning about the distances, areas and volumes of the geometric figures;
these magnitudes were a quantitative estimate of such figures.
The structural approach induced to investigate its qualities, its non-quantitative geometric properties, and to establish
relations or laws for them.
The variational approach was hardly applied at that time, and we will not see it appear clearly until the 16th century
with the arrival of calculus, and only until the appearance of differential geometry will we really have it as an approach
applied to geometry.
2.3 Arithmetic
Arithmetic was born mainly with an algorithmic approach. Its task was to study the logical procedures that would allow
a calculation to be carried out correctly. Thus, learning arithmetic in ancient times consisted of learning algorithms to
perform basic operations, such as adding, subtracting, dividing, multiplying, and finding square roots. Also appeared
the solution approach, and the notion of equation.
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The ancients cleverly solved issues about solving equations. The structural approach joined the solution approach.
Analyzing the structural properties of numbers, the associative, distributive, and commutative laws were discovered.
The results achieved with the algorithmic approach were compiled in arithmetic, while the structural and solution
approach applied to more abstract objects gave rise to Algebra.
2.4 Historical development of other approaches
During the 17th century René Descartes (1596-1650) managed to combine spatial and solution approaches, creating
analytical geometry. The French philosopher conceived geometric figures as solutions to certain given conditions,
namely algebraic equations. Thus, a circumference would be in Euclid’s geometry the locus of the points that are
equidistant from a center, while in Descartes’s geometry, a circumference would be formed by the points that satisfy the
equation
x2 + y2 = r2
Descartes viewed geometric objects with a solution approach, fusing the three main approaches of ancient mathematics
into a new geometry. “The construction of equations therefore plays a central role in Descartes”[18, p. 212]
Until Descartes, the variational approach had not been fully developed. With the arrival of the Differential Calculus it
acquires its own appearance. I. Newton and G. Leibniz added such point of view to analytic geometry when conceiving
their new mathematics.
The arrival of Calculus allowed the expression of a new type of equations, which included derivatives of functions. In
this way the solution approach had new objects to apply to, engendering the theory of differential equations.
Differential calculus + solution approach→ differential equation theory.
From its inception, calculus harbored a dual approach. The variational approach, which, as already mentioned, originated
the differential version of calculus, and the quantitative approach, which is in the core of Integral Calculus.
Integration allows estimating areas and magnitudes, that is, it allows quantification, however, its close relationship
with differentiation is striking; calculus establishes a beautiful relationship between the variational and the quantitative
in the fundamental theorem of calculus. This relationship leads us to think about the close union that exists between
matter and form, responsible according to the scholastics for accidents of quantity and quality, from which those two
approaches arise.
We can think that the quantitative point of view sparked a new branch of mathematics, which is currently known
as theory of measurement. Initially, this approach was tacitly applied in arithmetic and geometry; measuring and
enumerating are essential activities in this approach. Calculation discovered an excellent tool for quantity measurement:
integration; and this idea has since been generalized to conceive of any quantitative evaluation in a measurable space.
Geometry as such, even with Descartes contribution, remained in part as a object-oriented geometry, yet the basis for
the geometric study of space per se was laid, and vector spaces and non-Euclidean geometries appeared in the 18th and
19th centuries, and finally, entering the 20th century, the topology and tensor analysis. Topology especially shows to us
in its most abstract form the use of the spatial approach.
As we have seen, a second approach can be added to a given approach, to form a new study area. Thus, the spatial
approach joins the variational to generate differential geometry.
Geometry + variational approach→ differential geometry.
On the other hand, the mathematical algorithmic approach, inherent to the old arithmetic as it has been said, permeates
almost all the areas of the current mathematics, where we need algorithms, to calculate or find something. The advent
of electronic computers prompted the careful and systematic study of such procedures. Thus appear the computational
number theory, computational geometry, etc. The most modern areas of mathematics are a direct consequence of this
approach, as is the case of fractal theory and recursion.
There is no place here for a careful examination of how each area of mathematics has arisen and a justification of how
the different approaches that we have proposed have been combined. However what has been said will be enough
for the reader to understand our proposal and appreciate the convenience of it to explain the genesis of each area of
mathematics. It is important to note that many areas have been divided for not mathematical reasons, but because
pedagogical or pragmatic motives. The distinction, for example, of applied mathematics does not respond to a change
of point of view towards mathematical objects, but to a segregation due to the utility for practical purposes. In spite
of all this, we can find in the most conscientious classifications of branches of mathematics some similarity with our
enumeration of approaches. In the AMS [19] Mathematics Subject Classification, a certain parity can be identified with
our subject grouping.
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3 Conclusions
As we have seen, the proposal of the six fundamental approaches (seven if material approach is considered) give
us a good guideline to understand the historical development of mathematics. In addition it is also a useful tool to
understand the internal structure of this beautiful science, and although it does not generate a library classification of the
mathematical branches, it helps us understand the origin of the differences between some branches and others. Certainly
other approaches may be added in later studies, however they do not necessarily have to be completely independent of
the approaches listed here. It seems to be the internal ontological-psychological skeleton of the exact sciences, which
should not be conceived as a tree, but as a network of combinations and connections.
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